The 2010 General Election provided Britain’s first hung parliament since 1974, and the first coalition government since the Churchill Ministry. Naturally, having the Conservatives in government alongside a smaller coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, several challenges arose when considering how the government should function. One such way in which the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats successfully enshrined this vision was in the coalition agreement [1]. Whilst this set out an initial direction for the new government to follow, a more consistent, regular way of ensuring that both parties remained united under a common vision was required. The last emergency budget meeting before publication took place between the Conservative Prime Minster and Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Cameron and George Osborne respectively, as well as the Liberal Democrat leader and deputy PM Nick Clegg, and Chief Secretary to the Treasury Danny Alexander. With civil servants normally referring to meetings between two individuals as a ‘bilateral’, the meeting between the aforementioned individuals was noted in the Number 10 diary as a ‘quadrilateral’ [2] and thus gave creation to ‘The Quad’, which became effectively an inner cabinet comprising of the key individuals from each party in the coalition. The Quad was not originally part of the coalition agreement[3], arising through chance as opposed to design, yet became one of the most powerful and ‘crucial’[4] groupings within government, with a majority of key decisions, especially economically, going through the Quad. There is of course historical precedence for running a smaller, more inner cabinet of sorts. Whilst a majority of this historical precedence takes place under wartime conditions or ‘near wartime’ in the case of Atlee[5]. Previous Conservative Prime Ministers have made frequent use of inner wartime cabinets, such as Thatcher during the Falklands war [6], Macmillan [7] during the nuclear arms race, or perhaps most famously Churchill’s war cabinet during World War Two. Another antecedent example of the usage of inner cabinets were those seen during the Blair years, with the government often being accused of running a ‘kitchen cabinet’, with a declining use of the overall cabinet in favour of more centralised decision making[8]. Blair additionally made strong use of centralised decision making amongst smaller groups during the Iraq war[9]. We can see strong precedence for smaller internal groups to make decisions within government with some being formalised, in the case of war cabinets, and some being more informal, in the case of ‘kitchen’ cabinets, with the Quad definitely falling into the latter category. This essay will examine the nature of the Quad’s impact upon David Cameron’s Prime Ministerial power, and on whether the use of such a small internal group aided policy implementation within government. There were numerous key policy developments undertaken throughout the coalition years, with austerity and economic policies making up a key proportion of the agenda. Furthermore, the controversial Lansley reforms to the NHS neither made ‘policy or political sense’ according to Liberal Democrat minister David Laws[10], and are an example of policy ‘falling through the cracks’ within the Quad. Finally, the last policy area to be analysed will be constitutional reforms. A key part of the coalition for the Liberal Democrats, constitutional reform packages were agreed within the confines of the Quad, of which ‘no left-wing Lib Dem or right-wing Tories were allowed anywhere near’ [11]. Once agreed by the Quad and put to a vote in Parliament, the reform package faced significant difficulty.
With the Treasury having two cabinet members out of the twenty-one total, one may certainly make the case that the Treasury was vastly overrepresented in the Quad, with both cabinet members (Osborne and Alexander) attending Quad meetings, highlighting a disproportionately large treasury influence. This may be in part due to the fact that Osborne and Alexander are two of the most trusted advisors to Cameron and Clegg, their leaders, although as Chancellor of the Exchequer, it would be surprising not to see Osborne as a member of such a key piece of government machinery. The reason for including both Osborne and Alexander is more likely to lie with the fact that the Coalition was elected during a period of economic crisis, with austerity and balancing the budget deficit being key tenets of the coalition agreement[12]. With the Quad being the primary vehicle for policy agreement and implementation, it is certainly logical to have the two highest ranking treasury ministers as members. Furthermore, economic policy is the logical place to begin when analysing the effectiveness of the policy implementation conducted by the quad due to the supreme importance placed upon it, with the coalition holding an emergence budget within a month of being elected, to avoid ‘dire consequences’ and an ‘economic catastrophe’[13]. On the economy, it is clear that the Quad played a particularly active role in policy agreement and implementation, with every budget being signed off in a Quad meeting, and considerably lengthy discussions taking place within the Quad over each budget, statement and sinew of economic policy. The governments overarching aim in terms of economic policy was to ‘eliminate the deficit’ well before the next election, aiming to be in surplus by late 2014, with a secondary aim of reducing the government’s debt to GDP ratio[14]. With the heavy Treasury influence within the Quad designed to facilitate the agreement of austerity policies, it is clear that the Quad was effective in implementing these policies, with consistent budgetary cuts emerging year after year from all non-ringfenced departments. However, whilst the Quad may have been successful in achieving budgetary cuts and implementing a wide range of deficit reduction policies, questions can certainly be asked as to the effectiveness of these policies, and whether their implementation by the Quad was actually successful. Regarding the two primary aims of the economic policy aforementioned, the budget deficit was not eliminated by the time of the 2015 election, nor by the time Cameron and Osborne left office. Additionally, the secondary aim of seeing a reduction of the debt to GDP ratio was achieved for one solitary year between 2014 and 2015, which is not a resounding success as per the Coalition agreement’s stated objectives. The lack of economic success and considerable criticism facing the government[15] questions the Quad’s effectiveness at implementing good economic policy. Whilst those in the Quad would protest that the economy was on the correct trend lines, and that further outside shocks were the reason for the lack of achievement in relation to the stated objectives [16], it can certainly be argued that the lack of individuality and narrow scope of economic ideas within the Quad were a reason for the lack of economic success. Liberal Democrat deputy leader and economist Vince Cable was kept firmly away from economic discussions which were highly centralised within the Quad. Additionally, some have described Danny Alexander as ‘going native’ and being ‘the Treasury representative to the liberal democrats’ [17] or even as a ‘mini me’ towards George Osborne[18]. This distinct lack of individuality amongst the Treasury members of the Quad undoubtedly stifled the implementation of economic policy within the group, with a narrow range of views and ideas implemented, highlighting the benefits of examining key issues in a somewhat broader environment. This was further compounded since Cameron ‘largely lead’ the Quad with Osborne ‘generally always in agreement’. With a prime minister and a chancellor being so close and lacking the ability to effectively question each other, added to the fact that the Liberal Democrat chief secretary was largely in agreement with the chancellor, it leaves the Quad within an almost unanimous agreement on key economic issues, the primary focus of the coalition’s policy programme, highlighting a distinct disadvantage of centralising decision making amongst such a small group of key figures. A significant example of this is prior to the 2012 budget, where Osborne is intent on cutting the top rate of tax from 50%. He sets about ‘cornering’ Cameron into agreement, knowing that Alexander fully supports him, with Clegg now not in a position to disagree. This highlights the high level of power centralisation making huge decisions and bringing into question the effectiveness of the Quad as a mechanism for policy implementation. The 2012 budget was known as the ‘Omnishambles Budget’, which ‘gave the coalition a hammering’[19], and is perhaps proof that the Quad was not an effective mechanism for implementing economic policy for the coalition. In terms of agreeing economic policy, the Quad was crucial. But whether this was the correct range of policies to implement remains contested. This example also serves to prove the ceding of prime ministerial power via the Quad. As First Lord of The Treasury, the prime minister does retain economic power, although this was significantly ceded to the Quad, which had final say on all key economic decisions. For example, Nick Clegg was able to veto Cameron’s plans to cut spending at a faster rate in both 2012 and 2013.[20] Furthermore, due to Cameron being ‘generally in agreement with Osborne’[21], the chancellor was abnormally powerful due to the closeness of their relationship, certainly more powerful than any chancellor since, and perhaps before with the exception of Gordon Brown. This argument is somewhat negated due to the fact that Cameron did lead the Quad as Prime Minister [22].
With the Quad being ‘absolutely crucial’ [23] to the policymaking/implementation process for the coalition, one would expect all key areas of public service reform to be significantly scrutinised within the meetings of the Quad in order to ensure no political errors were made. This was unfortunately not the case for the ‘Lansley Reforms’, which entailed the biggest reorganisation of the NHS for decades. Highly controversial, and since being reversed [24], the reforms were politically toxic towards the coalition, and not prevented or picked up early enough by the Quad. Conservative commentator Matthew d’Ancona suggests that the Lansley Reforms ‘fell through the cracks’ with regards to the Quad, and that members had ‘taken on too much, causing them to take their eye off the ball’ [25]. David Laws refers to the reforms as a ‘self-inflicted wound’ This further illustrates the weakness of the Quad in a policy implementation aspect. With members being across multiple key issues across the heart of government, they were unable to spot key issues within the bill until it was already presented to parliament. The debacle was in part due to Lansley feeling marginalised and concerned that members of the Quad such as Alexander may get a say in his reforms, causing him to press on with announcement regardless of whether they had been agreed in the Quad or not.[26]. The symptom of feeling marginalised by the Quad and the high centralisation of power is a constant theme across multiple areas and was a key concern for the Quad and the Coalition as a whole in regard to constitutional reform, with many backbench MPs rebelling due to the feeling of being sidelined. The lack of intervention by the Quad over the Lansley Reforms until a very late stage highlights the lack of effectiveness of the group at keeping both abreast of and in the detail of all key policy issues at once. The coalition’s sparing use of cabinet committees, reduced to just 8[27], may have been a remedy to the issue, with a larger group with less to focus on being able to more effectively scrutinise the bill before publication. However, despite not being initially alert to the dangers and lack of popularity of the bill, the Quad were able to spend three full meetings rectifying issues with the bill in order to propose amendments[28], perhaps showing the group’s effectiveness lies in reacting to issues rather than being specifically proactive. With the Lansley Reforms being the most contentious piece of domestic reform under the Coalition, it severely brings into question the effectiveness of the Quad as a policy implementation mechanism if the group is failing to spot key issues with vital pieces of legislation over the course of 18 months.
The third key area of domestic legislation which was agreed almost entirely within the confines of the Quad is the constitutional reform agenda. Constitutional reform was key part of the Coalition Agreement, and a significant area in which the Liberal Democrats hoped to see advancement from the Coalition[29]. Areas in which the Liberal Democrats were striving to see reform on included; the voting system, which culminated in a referendum in 2011 on accepting ‘AV’ as a new system, and specifically on House of Lords reform, which the Liberal Democrats aimed to replace with an elected second chamber. Constitutional reform is an area which is particularly important to Liberal Democrats, but viewed with scepticism and unease by Conservatives, to say the least. Pledges were made within the coalition agreement to examine the constitutional reform issues [30], however a majority of the proposed reforms were agreed by the Quad, much to the dismay of Conservative backbenchers. The AV referendum was a definite success of the Quad, implementing a manifesto pledge by the Liberal Democrats and a key factor within the Coalition Agreement. Whilst the package for House of Lords reform was ‘swiftly agreed’ during coalition negotiations[31], the bill was dropped in 2012 after negotiations with Conservative rebels failed, many of whom felt that the bill had been agreed within the Quad without any outside input from other members of the cabinet, or backbench MPs. The disagreements over Lords reforms ranged beyond the confines of the Quad as the bill was highly contentious with Conservative backbenchers, with nearly 100 disagreeing on principle alone[32], the key issue remains that the Quad was unable to implement the agreed position of the coalition government on Lords reform, which demonstrates the lack of ability of the Quad in key areas of policy implementation. On areas such as the economy where there was little backbench disapproval, the Quad was more successful at implementing policy. However, when seeds of discontent were already sewn amongst backbenchers, the Quad was ineffective and unable to implement policy, with the Lords reforms being a key example. Furthermore, the fact that many Conservative MPs felt ‘disenfranchised’[33] by the fact that policy was being effectively decided by two Liberal Democrats alongside two Conservatives was a cause for the difficulty seen by the Quad in implementing contentious areas of policy, and more alignment and involvement of backbench MPs may have allowed the Quad to implement policy more effectively.
Power in the Coalition became too centralised, around the Quad with too much of a burden being placed on too few people for effective government and policy implementation to take place. If there was more regular discussion with relevant ministers around key issues such as the Lansley reforms, either in cabinet or via cabinet committees, then costly political mistakes may not have been made by the Coalition. The view that decisions should be made by a wider group is shared by Kevin Tebbit, who suggested that decision making around the Iraq war may have been aided by larger groups, and more challenging in debates, as opposed to the small group decision making seen over Iraq[34]. This aligns with historical precedent, where although war cabinets and decision making amongst key ministers away from the larger cabinet are common, they were not taken to the extent seen in the Coalition, with a small group such as the Quad taking quite as much supremacy. Furthermore, smaller war cabinets were only focused on war. With a vast majority of the Coalition’s policy agenda flowing through the Quad, this represents a significant change as to how the machinery of government is run, in a starkly different manner than to previous historic precedent.
A coalition is unique in that there are two distinct power centres, comprising of the leaders of both coalition party members. In a normal government, the prime minister retains a significant power base, however this is in some ways shifted during the Coalition years with Cameron ceding some power on decision making to Clegg. However in many ways, it can be argued that some prime ministerial powers are in fact ceded to the Quad, especially in matters on the economy, in which Osborne was clearly in the ascendency, strongly backed up by Alexander. Similarly to the way Blair left economic policy to be largely Brown’s domain, Cameron allowed Osborne, or more specifically the Quad significant power over economic policy. Members were able to veto decisions on contentious economic policies, as Clegg regularly did [35], highlighting the dilution of economic power from the prime minister and the chancellor to the Quad as a whole. The ability for the deputy prime minister, not a Lord of the Treasury, to veto decisions on matters of economic policy is significant. Additionally, one traditionally useful prime ministerial power is that of ‘hiring and firing’ in which the prime minister is able to hire and fire ministers at will. This is another example of a power ceded to the Quad, in which reshuffles were regularly discussed. Whilst the Conservatives maintained the ability to hire and fire Conservative ministers, and the same with Lib Dem leaders, Cameron did rely on Osborne who ‘prides himself on identifying talent’[36] and Clegg on key decisions with regard to reshuffles. Additionally, Cameron was unable to hire and fire completely at will as is the traditional prime ministerial power, due to the fact that a certain number of cabinet and ministerial positions had to be filled by Liberal Democrats, with Clegg carrying out his own reshuffle.
On the other hand, whilst there was a small dilution of prime ministerial power to the Quad, this was largely centred around the powers of hiring and firing, and Cameron’s prime ministerial powers were not significantly impacted by the Quad, with the group being more important as a mechanism for policy agreement and implementation. Furthermore, Cameron remained dominant within the Quad, and was usually backed up by Osborne who remained staunchly loyal to his boss[37]. Osborne’s loyalty, and Cameron’s position of strength as prime minister allowed him to retain much of his power over the Quad, and this can be exemplified by a number of key policy decisions, such as the Liberal Democrats reversing their manifesto pledge on tuition fees, a move which they never recovered from with regards to polling. Another example of Cameron maintaining his power over the Quad was his complete refusal to reform winter fuel allowances for the elderly. Cameron was able to ‘immediately shut down debate’ and ‘point blank refuse to consider the issue’[38] and without his support, the issue was dead in the water. The nature of the Quad meant that it was more a forum for policy agreement, discussion and implementation, and less of a base for the dilution of prime ministerial power.
A ‘full blown experiment at the heart of government’[39], the Quad served its purpose effectively as a mechanism for policy discussion and agreement during the Coalition years and was a strong foundation for the Coalition to be built upon. That being said, the Quad was ineffective as a medium for policy implementation and was used to cover the implementation of too broad of a range of issues, with the lack of use of cabinet committees during the Coalition years meaning too much of the burden was placed on the Quad. Additionally, the Quad had little impact upon the power of Cameron as Prime Minister. Other than the power of hiring and firing which was in part ceded to Clegg, Cameron remained firmly at the helm of the Coalition, clearly in charge of strategy and general direction. Cameron certainly retained a majority of his prime ministerial powers, with the sharing of powers regarding economic decision making largely shared with specifically Osborne, due to the closeness of their relationship, as opposed to the Quad as a whole. Dorney and Garnett provide an accurate portrayal of the Quad, saying that the group was ‘ineffective in terms of policymaking’ but that ‘the Coalition couldn’t have survived without it’[40]. This is a sentiment firmly echoed by Seldon, who is also of the view that the Quad was ‘ineffective’ when geared towards implementation instead of agreement and discussion.[41] The examples of key policy areas paint a similar picture, with the Quad being effective in terms of agreeing on a general direction for policy to take, but lacking the ability or manpower to effectively implement the policies agreed upon, perhaps lacking a delivery unit to implement their agreements, such as Michael Barber’s which implemented policy for Blair. Additionally, it is clear that the Quad had a negative effect in some areas of policy implementation, with backbenchers feeling ‘disenfranchised’[42], and being one of the most rebellious parliaments on record [43]. Furthermore, the lack of foresight from the Quad with regards to the Lansley Reforms further highlights the lack of ability for the group as a policy implementation mechanism. The Quad can be characterised as a good mechanism for policy agreement, and on specific individual issues, for policy implementation as well. However, the Quad was ineffective at policy implementation on a government wide level, and needed to be supported by a delivery unit, or greater use of cabinet committees to comb through the finer details on large bills such as the Lansley Reforms.
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